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1Introduction
With the deadline for the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) fast approaching, debates at the UN level on a pro-
spective new, post-2015, development agenda have intensi-
fied. Inextricably linked to the discussions on a revised goal-
set are financial considerations over the types of resources 
that public and private actors should provide in support of 
the international development policies, possibly stressing 
more general global concerns such as climate change, mi-
gration and others (UN 2013). These questions are linked 
to the OECD-wide discussions on the future conceptualiza-
tion and measurement of Official Development Assistance 
(ODA) – a central concept that due to inter alia the ‘embel-
lishment’ of reported flows by certain donors has lost some 
of its appeal over the years. As a result of the global financial 
and economic crisis, growing public debt has led to austerity 
programs in many OECD donor countries and, with only a 
few exceptions, translated into cuts in ODA budgets. Donors 
have reacted to this situation of constrained resources dif-
ferently, but some trends are becoming visible. While some 
countries (e.g. the Netherlands) have effectively abandoned 
their commitment to the 0.7 % ODA target, others, which 
are officially sticking to it, are intensifying their efforts to in-
crease their performance by unorthodox measures. Amongst 
the latter, two related avenues are becoming increasingly 
popular: firstly, leveraging public aid money (grants) with ever 
increasing amounts of private money; and secondly, pressing 
towards a wider definition of what counts as ODA.
In this context, ÖFSE conducted a research project on the 
relevance of soft loans as an instrument of development fi-
nance.1 Given the lack of public knowledge and academic 
research, (i) the institutional evolution of soft loans within 
the Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits (Ar-
rangement) was traced, and (ii) the extent to which develop-
ment policy aspects are integrated into soft loan programs 
were scrutinized by an in-depth analysis of four European 
countries. Upon that basis, we draw some lessons and pres-
ent four scenarios for the future use of soft loans as an in-
strument of development finance.
An Instrument of Export Promotion at its Origin
For decades soft loans, concessional long-term credits, 
have formed part of foreign trade and development finance 
policies in most DAC donor countries. These have been 
widely used to finance exports and investment projects in 
richer developing countries particularly in Eastern Asia and 
were mainly tied to procurement of goods and services in 
the donor country. A qualitative analysis of OECD archive 
footage conducted by ÖFSE showed that in its beginnings 
this instrument has been inextricably linked with tradition-
al export credits. From 1978 onwards the usage of export 
credits has been restricted by the Arrangement as part of 
the OECD’s export promotion framework, the latter aiming at 
the elimination of trade distorting practices. Throughout the 
1980ies concerns grew that tied soft loans were used as a 
backdoor subsidization of national industries. Successively 
they have thus been brought under regulation through the 
Arrangement. In particular since the adoption of the Helsin-
ki Package (1991/92) a partial shift towards development 
policy can be observed. Donors justify the legitimacy of their 
programs, while being in contradiction with the OECD’s lib-
eral trade philosophy, through postulated development goals 
and their leverage potential. Given the officially stated moti-
vation of contributing to development in recipient countries 
and conveying a 25 % grant element, the concessional part 
of a tied soft loan becomes ODA-eligible and contributes to 
a donor’s overall ODA performance. Yet, the developmental 
dimension of soft loan policies has remained rather vague. 
This begs the question, whether there is further potential to 
be exploited for a stronger development orientation of (tied) 
soft loans.
Mapping the Field of Soft Loan Financing
While prior to the inception of the Helsinki rules, tied aid 
notifications, expressed as percentage of the volume of bi-
lateral ODA, accounted for roughly one fifth, the relative im-
portance of tied aid experienced a sharp decline ever since. 
As of 2005 tied aid constitutes only a small fraction (~ 4 %) 
of bilateral ODA. Figure 1 illustrates the sharp decrease in 
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untied nature and their grant form, respectively, the latter two 
are covered by neither the rules on project and country el-
igibility nor the notification obligations of the Arrangement. 
The comparison of the selected programs with regard to the 
respective institutional set-up, decision-making processes, 
project evaluation procedures as well as transparency and 
accountability provisions revealed a marked heterogeneity 
in the soft loan landscape. In addition, the extent to which 
development safeguards are built into the policies and pro-
grams as well as the degree of alignment with overall devel-
opment policy varies. This suggests that development policy 
aspects are anchored in the programs to different degrees 
and that there is development potential to be exploited. From 
the comparison three general conclusions on the character-
istics of national soft loan policies can be derived:
1. The Institutional Heterogeneity of Soft Loan  
Financing
Albeit reunited in the quest for financing large-scale infra-
structure projects, the programs show considerable differ-
ences in almost all dimensions analyzed. Hence the het-
erogeneity of both the institutional structures as well as 
the programmatic design is one of the central traits of the 
sphere of soft loan financing. Accordingly, the harmonization 
of donor policies as stipulated in the Paris Declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness has remained limited. Generally a myriad of 
actors from both the development policy field and the trade 
domain assume a role in soft loan policies – mainly the min-
istry in charge of development cooperation, the aid agency, 
the Ministry of Finance and the Export Credit Agency. Yet, the 
distribution of competences among them varies substantial-
ly. Remarkably, in all case study countries but Austria political 
responsibilities for the strategic orientation of the programs 
lies with the ministry in charge of development cooperation. 
Whereas in Denmark also program implementation is con-
centrated in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Danida), the 
German Ministry for Development Cooperation (BMZ) del-
egates administration to the KfW Development Bank. The 
Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs entrusts NL Agency with 
the implementation of ORIO, the former being an agency 
of the Ministry of Economic Affairs. This heterogeneity at 
the level of institutions appears to be due to specific pow-
er balances among relevant actors as well as a function of 
the respective program objectives. The low degree of har-
monization also among Helsinki-type programs can partially 
be explained by the reluctance of the Arrangement to give 
guidance with regard to implementation structures. The lat-
ter – as such the product of negotiations between sovereign 
states on a sensitive issue – leaves considerable room for 
maneuver to national actors and does not spell out any pref-
erence for which kind of agency should be in charge of tied 
soft loans. As a result, the implementing body might or might 
not have a development mandate to fulfill. Considering that 
the development of recipient countries is an officially stated 
goal pursued with soft loans and results in the ODA-eligibili-
ty of the concessional element inherent to them, it should be 
ensured that the implementing agencies have the necessary 
development competences and tools in order to attain the 
stated goals.
the volume of tied aid notifications in the early 1990ies. Af-
ter a 2-year transition period following the adoption of the 
Helsinki Package, the volume of Helsinki-type tied aid re-
mained fairly stable. The main donors notifying tied aid from 
1996-2005 were Japan, Spain, France, Germany and the 
Netherlands. Analysis of sectoral notifications suggests that 
the largest share of tied aid has been fuelled into the sectors 
transportation and storage (35 %) followed by water supply 
and sanitation (16 %), and energy generation and supply 
(15 %). Contrary to these mainly large capital-intensive in-
frastructure projects, sectors, which typically receive grants, 
such as health or education, appear to attract comparably 
small shares. In terms of geographical distribution, the region 
that received most total tied aid was East Asia and the Pa-
cific (45 %). With roughly 20 % China was by far the largest 
recipient of tied aid, followed by Indonesia, Vietnam, the Phil-
ippines, and Turkey (Fritz et al. 2014: 171).
Figure 1: Overview of the Volume and Number of Tied 
Aid Notifications 1991-2005 (Million USD)
Source: TD/PG 2006
Note: The figure is based on notifications recorded by the Participants Group 
between 1991 and 2005. Due to classification policies for OECD documents, 
data on notifications as from 2006 onwards could not be accessed.
While tied soft loan programs had been in place in most 
OECD countries up to the early 1990ies, the programs and 
their successors have evolved into different directions ever 
since. These new forms are not necessarily covered by the 
framework of the Arrangement, mostly because they are 
de jure not conditional upon procurement from the donor 
country. ÖFSE conducted a comparative analysis of national 
implementation strategies of Arrangement terms and anal-
ogous soft loan programs in Austria, Denmark, Germany 
and the Netherlands. Two of the programs scrutinized, the 
Austrian Soft Loan Program and Denmark’s Danida Busi-
ness Finance essentially build on the provisions laid down 
in the Arrangement. They are both largely procurement-tied 
and soften the terms of a commercial loan, mainly by provid-
ing interest rate subsidies. In contrast, Germany’s Financial 
Cooperation provides de jure untied loans showing different 
concessionality levels. The most peculiar case in the sam-
ple is the Dutch program ORIO, which associates its formal-
ly untied grants with commercial loans (for which typically 
a guarantee by the Dutch ECA is available). Due to their 
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2. The Hybridity of the Instruments
The position of soft loans at the interface of export promo-
tion and development policy evokes a certain ambiguity in 
their programmatic orientation which is reflected in the multi-
plicity of goals stated in program descriptions and the result-
ing attempt to ‘kill two birds with one stone’. Yet, the specific 
hierarchy of goals, the project approval procedures as well 
as the financing terms might bring programs closer to either 
the trade or the development cooperation pole. By adopt-
ing a long-term perspective on the evolution of soft loan 
financing, a trend towards strengthening the development 
orientation of soft loan instruments over the last decades 
can be noted. Throughout the 1990ies and 2000s, develop-
ment components increasingly – though to different extents 
– manifested themselves at least partially in the untying of 
the programs, in project appraisal and approval procedures, 
and in financing modalities. The untying of aid has been gen-
erally propagated by the DAC as a major step towards great-
er effectiveness of invested resources. In this vein, both the 
German Financial Cooperation as well as the Dutch ORET 
program (the predecessor of ORIO) were untied and Danida 
complemented its tied program with an untied window. For-
mal untying, however, does neither per se lead to a propor-
tional increase in the development orientation of programs, 
nor is it necessarily motivated by aid effectiveness. In the late 
1990ies, concern was raised by participants to the Arrange-
ment regarding the circumvention of Helsinki provisions via 
the de jure untying of soft loan financing. For instance, loans 
which are formally untied might be provided on significantly 
harder terms because they do not have to comply with the 
35/50 % concessionality requirements of the Arrangement, 
but only the 25 % grant element threshold of the DAC calcu-
lated with a uniform 10 % discount rate. In the case of Ger-
many, the fact that due to prevailing low interest rates also 
low-concessional loans, presumably without any budgetary 
effort, are reported as ODA, might exemplify such concerns. 
These reporting practices have triggered discussions about 
the – as of now not benchmarked – ODA criterion ‘conces-
sional in character’ and show the importance of refining de-
cades-old practices (DCD/DAC 2012; also Manning 2013).
3. Development as Economic Development
Taking up the additionality argument, which is ingrained in 
soft loan financing, suggests that in view of internal resource 
constraints, external financial flows e.g. in the form of soft 
loans are thought to impact positively on development pro-
cesses. From this perspective they contribute to econom-
ic growth that will eventually trickle down and create wider 
benefits, mainly via employment creation and income gen-
eration. The programs, thus, draw on a conventional notion 
of development. Furthermore, the examination of program 
objectives suggests that it is assumed that the provision of 
public goods, which in the absence of soft loan financing 
would not have been produced or not in the required amount 
by the market, is key to development. A focus on the provi-
sion of not only physical but also social infrastructure has 
been observable since the introduction of the commercial 
non-viability requirement for procurement-tied projects in 
the early 1990ies. This can be interpreted as a conceptu-
al re-orientation towards the notion of human development, 
which became the lead discourse on development at that 
time. In the 2000s, concerns over the sustainability of de-
velopment in its economic, social and environmental dimen-
sions gained momentum and have also entered the field of 
soft loan financing. Concomitantly, several programs includ-
ed the environmental sector as a priority sector. In recent 
years a priority and rhetorical shift towards Private Sector 
Development (PSD) can be observed also in the field of soft 
loan financing. Given the traditional focus on infrastructure 
development and public projects it remains, however, unclear 
how any such reorientation could effectively be implemented.
What Future for Soft Loans?
Though national programs have been quite distinct, our anal-
ysis has shown that soft loans have been an integral part 
of external and development finance policies, respectively, in 
almost all DAC donor countries during the last four decades. 
Today, the importance and share in volume of the respective 
concessional finance programs with respect to the overall 
ODA of a given country varies considerably, with classical 
tied aid programs lying between 1-6 % of total ODA. By ex-
tensively using blending mechanisms, untied concessional 
finance has increased substantially in the case of Germany. 
In contrast, tied soft loan financing volumes have decreased 
and some countries have evidently initialized steps to reform 
their development finance mechanisms. Triggered by shifts 
in the geographies of development, the question arises of 
whether a tied soft loan instrument is still fit for purpose. 
While the rapid economic development of emerging econ-
omies, and in particular China and Indonesia, has for many 
years provided a geo-economic environment favorable to us-
ing soft loan mechanisms, the graduation of many of these 
countries into upper middle-income status has effectively 
curtailed this avenue for the foreseeable future. The pros-
pects that a great number of other LDCs will follow the ex-
ample of the highly dynamic emerging countries remain un-
clear as of now. Thus, the current situation suggests a shift 
of focus towards less developed markets, which might be 
less attractive from an export promotion point of view. The 
adaptation strategies adopted by the case study countries to 
overcome the legitimization problems and imminent crisis of 
soft loan policies differ. With the introduction of the “promo-
tional loans” Germany, for instance, tailored its instruments 
to specific circumstances in emerging economies. Any such 
financing, of course, is only conceivable outside the scope of 
the Arrangement. On the contrary, in the Netherlands a re-
newed impetus for the export orientation is observable with 
the introduction of the Dutch Good Growth Fund.
Future developments in the soft loan field will possibly be 
influenced by the anticipated changes in the international 
development architecture post-2015, and in particular by the 
discussions on the future of development finance. The latter 
is likely to be increasingly affected by non-OECD countries 
which themselves have become donors, but are not (yet) 
abiding by the same rules as the DAC members. Due to 
the considerable volume of annual concessional flows from 
emerging economies to Low-Income Countries (World Bank 
2013: 19), the DAC has increased its efforts to integrate the 
New Donors into the OECD framework – the latest initiative 
being the first High Level Meeting of the Global Partnership 
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for Effective Co-operation in Mexico in April 2014.2 Con-
sidering this dynamically changing international politico-eco-
nomic landscape, which without doubt will exert a significant 
influence upon the prospects of development finance, ÖFSE 
research identified four scenarios for the future of soft loans 
as an instrument of concessional finance. These can be cat-
egorized along the two fundamental dimensions – degree 
of concessionality (low/high) and tying status (tied/untied).
Figure 2: Four Scenarios for the Future of Soft Loans
Source: Own Elaboration
Scenario A, the combination of tying with low levels of 
concessionality (< 35 %), is not permissible under current 
Arrangement terms and would contradict one of the core 
principles of the DAC development agenda. Scenario B com-
bines untying with low concessionality levels. As described, 
some of our case study countries have recently moved into 
this direction by leveraging stagnant budgetary aid resources 
with private monies. Assuming that ODA will remain scarce 
in the near future, both due to the continuation of austerity 
policies in many donor countries and the broadening of the 
post-2015 development agenda, we would posit that this 
scenario will be attractive to many donors. Scenario C merg-
es untied aid with a concessionality level above 50 %. This 
presupposes large grant elements in loans and would thus 
be particularly suitable for aid policies targeting LICs. This 
scenario depends on the political will to allocate substantial 
amounts of public money to such a program and the ac-
ceptance by the respective export interests, since no formal 
tying is allowed. Scenario D is a combination of tied aid with 
high levels of concessionality and represents the straightfor-
ward continuation of the Helsinki provisions for LICs.
A comparative discussion would suggest a juxtaposition of 
two pairs of scenarios. The first pair consists of Scenario A 
and C, implying a move from tied to untied, while concomi-
tantly increasing concessionality. This would of course rep-
resent an ideal-type movement away from export promotion 
towards development orientated goals. Unfortunately, from 
our perspective, this does not seem to be very realistic at 
the moment. Promoting growth, including via export policies, 
in order to exit the economic crisis remains the top priority 
in many OECD countries. Instead, we would posit that the 
second pair of scenarios consisting of B and D, respective-
ly, presents the more viable avenue under current economic 
and political conditions. Evidently, this pair involves a trade-off 
between tying status and concessionality level. Scenario B 
may become attractive for continuing soft loan programs with 
emerging economies, both for export promotion, particularly 
in the case of highly-competitive donor country exporters, as 
well as for targeted aid programs in those countries. Scenario 
D is the logical choice, if soft loan programs want to focus 
on LICs, while to some extent safeguarding donors’ export 
interests. From a development perspective, however, even 
highly concessional tied aid would contravene the spirit of the 
OECD development agenda which has declared the untying 
of aid a top priority. Thus, it would be imperative that such soft 
loan programs are aligned with donors’ development assis-
tance priorities and programmed in a way which adheres to 
basic development principles, in particular alignment, owner-
ship and policy coherence for development (PCD).
1 The full results of the ÖFSE research project are presented in: L. Fritz/W. 
Raza/M. Schuler/E. Schweiger:  Export Promotion or Development Pol-
icy? A Comparative Analysis of Soft Loan Policies in Austria, Denmark, 
Germany and the Netherlands. ÖFSE Edition 19. Vienna, 2014. http://
www.oefse.at/Downloads/publikationen/editionen/Edition19_web.pdf 
2 For information on the event see http://effectivecooperation.org/
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